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Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi's surprise announcement on 19 December to commit to 
"disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction" has furthered speculation that Tripoli 
may soon be removed from the American list of state sponsors of terrorism.[1] Such a move 
would bring about an end to U.S. economic sanctions that have been in place in one form or 
another for the past 30 years. Since the September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, D.C., the Libyan regime has made significant and progressive steps to rejoin the 
international community. Tripoli's desire to emerge from international isolation and end its pariah 
status now stands at a critical juncture: Does Qadhafi mean what he says and will Washington 
reciprocate and normalize relations with Libya? 
What has Libya done? 
Despite much of the commentary and analysis of Qadhafi's latest move in the mass media, the 
announcement to renounce Libya's quest for WMD was not a reaction to the war in Iraq as much 
as it was a continuation of Tripoli's desire to return to the fold. The discussions with Tripoli, 
conducted through British and American "good offices," have been going on for the past several 
years. The 19 December announcement has been a component of Libyan policy to graduate from 
American sanctions that began well in advance of the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
Furthermore, these discussions were conducted parallel to the Lockerbie negotiations held 
between the Washington, London, and Tripoli.[2]  
 
Following the 2001 terror attacks, Libya was among the first nations to "express its condolences 
to Washington."[3] Colonel Qadhafi further condemned the attacks as "horrifying and destructive," 
justified American military action as an act of self-defense, called on Libyans to "donate blood" to 
support the relief efforts in the U.S., and "denounced the use of anthrax attacks as 'demonic.'"[4] 
While illustrative of the seismic geopolitical reorganization brought about by al-Qaeda's assault 
on the American homeland, Qadhafi's public demeanor of support to Washington stems largely 
from Tripoli's intense desire to normalize relations with Washington.  
 
For Libya, positive relations with the United States not only equate to much needed American 
financial and technological investment; almost as importantly they translate into "the imprimatur of 
acceptance into the international community after years in the diplomatic wilderness."[5] Most 
significantly, an end to the U.S. sanctions would allow Libya to seek badly needed access to 
international financial organizations. 
 
While Libya has of late played a constructive role in regional affairs and also participated in 
several international organizations — including the Arab League, the African Union, and the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) — American and other international sanctions 
have proved challenging.[6] For instance, Tripoli would be eager to see the EU arms embargo 
lifted. Most significantly, an end to the U.S. sanctions would allow Libya to seek badly needed 
access to international financial organizations. 
 
Unlike other states, Libya has not suffered complete international isolation. North Korea, for 
instance, has been on the receiving end of much harsher international restrictions and punitive 
measures; comparatively Tripoli has had a relatively free hand in its foreign policy. Nonetheless, 
U.S.-driven sanctions have carried a high price for Tripoli. 
 
Towards that end, the Libyan government has cooperated with American intelligence agencies to 
"share what information it has on the activities"[7] of al-Qaeda, and also provided Washington 
with intelligence about "Libyan Islamist militants tied to al-Qaeda."[8] Libya, it is important to 
recall, has felt itself at war with al-Qaeda and its affiliates since at least the 1996 assassination 
attempt against Qadhafi by the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group[9] — a group designated by 
the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization.[10] Tripoli has maintained that the LIFG 
plot was inspired and financed by the al-Qaeda organization, and subsequently issued the first 
Interpol arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden. 
Challenges to Qadhafi's rule 
In recent years Qadhafi's rule has been challenged not only by the LIFG, but also by other 
Islamist organizations of varying strength. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Liberation 
Party have drawn the attention of some observers in part due to their ability to tap existing 
centers of discontent within Libyan society — in particular the deteriorating state of the economy, 
rising inflation, and sporadic shortages of basic goods. The Brotherhood's relative popularity in 
Libya is in large part due to its strengths witnessed elsewhere in the Arab world: solid social 
welfare programs and a strong anti-corruption stance help maintain the group's popularity. 
 
Similar to the LIFG is the Islamic Martyrs' Movement, another indigenous militant Libyan Islamist 
organization.[11] Like the LIFG, the Islamic Martyrs' Movement has waged an ongoing low-
intensity conflict with the regime. While little is publicly known, both organizations are believed to 
be composed of Libyan veterans of the Afghan campaign against the Soviet Union,[12] and 
receive funding and support through "private donations, various Islamic nongovernmental 
organizations, and criminal acts."[13] This fact can help explain Tripoli's desire to cooperate with 
Washington in the war on terror as Qadhafi identifies al-Qaeda and its affiliates as direct threats 
to his rule. 
 
Despite these challenges to the current Libyan regime, it seems improbable that Qadhafi and his 
coterie would be removed from power in a violent Islamist overthrow. Most opponents inside 
Libya and abroad have been successfully silenced. Some analysts forecast a post-Qadhafi Libya 
ruled in a marriage of convenience between the Islamists and the military.[14] One potential 
problem with the ascension of an Islamist government stems from the universal and absolutist 
worldview of such a system. Inevitably, the strict exclusiveness an Islamist regime may bring to 
Libya would likely run against the fabric of Libyan society; over 30 years of a repressive regime 
have exhausted much of the public. Such frictions would likely doom such a system before it had 
time to govern. 
 
Equally, it remains unlikely that Qadhafi would seek to install one of his sons as an heir-apparent, 
à la Syria in 2000 or what seems to be transpiring in Egypt at the moment. Such a monarchical 
presidency is a remote possibility; however one of the sons, maybe al-Mu'tassism, may step in 
temporarily to ensure continuity and bring together the country's power centers.[15] Perhaps the 
most likely development following Qadhafi's rule would be an administration that draws together 
the military, the state security apparatuses, the oligarchs, and ruling tribe.[16]  
 
The first order of business in the post-Qadhafi era will be economic revitalization and reversal of 
years of financial mismanagement. As such, the emergence of Libya's oligarchs and technocrats 
as a force within the new government is a definite possibility. Representative of Libya's significant 
economic potential, these constituencies have considerable motivations to liberalize the economy 
and achieve the stability that international investors desire. Additionally, it cannot be discounted 
that Libyan expatriates, exiles, and dissidents — both at home and abroad — would seize the 
opportunity presented by a post-Qadhafi era to advance their own agendas. 
Economic motivations 
It is important to note that Qadhafi's motivations to normalize Libyan behavior are not driven by 
good will alone. This policy is also very much a part of the regime's desire to reinvigorate Libya's 
economy, and end its pariah status.[17] The Libyan economy has suffered under successive 
mismanagement and international sanctions.[18] Tripoli boasts one of the highest per capita 
GDPs in Africa — approximately $6,200 in 2002 — and there is little reason why a Libya free 
from sanctions should not prosper. Its relatively small population of less than six million and the 
Libyan economy's reliance on foreign earnings from hydrocarbon exports should dispose a 
sanctions-free Libya hosting international investments to a relatively higher per capita GDP much 
more along the line of other traditional petro-economies.  
 
Nonetheless, Qadhafi has squandered much money financing various revolutionary organizations 
and liberation movements around the world. These eccentric expenditures could have been put to 
much better use had they been reinvested in the Libyan economy. and have created unnecessary 
hardships on Libyan society. Compounded with the mismanagement and alleged 
misappropriations of state funds, Tripoli's economy needs the benefits of trade with the West in 
order to sustain itself and remain a competitive destination for international investment. Some 
economic reforms have been implemented but much more is needed. Many observers stress that 
true economic liberalization will take time, since it would be a reversal of decades of Libyan policy 
and rhetoric. These reforms, in the estimations of some analysts, currently seem to be some time 
off, at least under the government's current structure, and even then their success in turning 
around the Libyan economy is not without question.[19] 
Benefits of relations with Libya: Oil  
Positive relations with Libya offer the United States several important benefits. First and foremost 
is access to the Libyan hydrocarbon market.[20] According to the most recent figures (2001), 
Libyan oil exports were approximately 1.429 million barrels per day (bpd). Its proven oil reserves 
are believed to figure at 29.75 billion barrels, ranking Libyan reserves ninth in the world.[21] 
Revenue from oil sales account for 99 percent of Libya's export earnings, or nearly eight billion 
dollars in 1995.[22] The U.S. Department of Energy forecasts Libyan exports doubling within the 
next five years.  
 
Libyan crude is highly sought after because of its high specific gravity and low sulfur content. This 
makes Libyan sweet crude especially lucrative in the production of "larger quantities of high-in-
demand light fuels" and the corresponding low refining costs. Furthermore, Libyan crude is 
valued for its relative closeness to European consumers, which currently receive about 95 
percent of all Libyan exports.[23] The European market is arguably the most attractive for both 
consumers and producer. Nonetheless, for an administration in Washington seeking to diversify 
its energy sources, Libyan sweet crude is appealing for a several reasons: it's plentiful, cheap to 
refine, and would likely take significantly less time to reach American markets compared to oil 
originating in the Persian Gulf. 
 
American oil companies such as Marathon and ConocoPhilips are "understood to still have 
extensive assets in Libya, which have been frozen since 1986."[24] It has also been reported that 
American oil executives maintain contacts with Libyan industry officials, and have visited Libya on 
several occasions, sometimes in secret and "were treated as honored guests."[25] There is little 
doubt that these corporations would like to regain control of their assets, just as their competitors 
would like to enter what has be termed one of the greatest under-invested oil markets today.  
 
Significantly for Libya, much of the energy infrastructure is based upon U.S. technology resulting 
from the prevalence of American firms during the country's oil discovery and initial extraction.[26] 
As a result, the Libyan market "cannot modernize without the assistance of big U.S. oil 
companies."[27] This serves as a benefit to American companies that may seek to return to the 
Libyan market in a post-sanctions era, as they would already have a competitive edge over their 
European rivals.  
 
Notably, despite the years of hostility, sanctions, isolation, and acrimony, the Libyan government 
has held previously American-owned and operated oil facilities in trust, rather than turning them 
over to more eager international contenders. In fact, the Libyan government notes that "although 
American companies abandoned their oil fields after U.S. sanctions were imposed in 1986, the 
government has not sold their rights to European firms."[28] This last fact demonstrates not only 
the desire of the regime in Tripoli to see American firms return, but is also indicative of the 
successes those businesses are likely to reap. 
 
This said, Libyan oil reserves should not be overstated. Within the larger scheme of things, 
Libyan crude represents a relatively small percentage of the world's overall availability. 
Furthermore, the fact that it has been several years since a complete and modern survey of 
Tripoli's potential hydrocarbon resources has been completed by American firms further 
obfuscates the present realities. Libya may not offer a panacea for oil-hungry American 
consumers, however that downplays the manner in which the international oil market works: oil is 
essentially a 'fungible' commodity.[29] That is, 'new' oil that comes on-line feeds into the 
international marketplace from which consumers draw. In this sense, Libyan crude can be of 
benefit. 
 
It should also be noted that it will require a very significant investment before Libya's oil industry 
can come on-line and prove productive. It is estimated that over two and a half billion dollars 
would be required just to overhaul Libya's two largest refineries.[30] Improving and upgrading the 
rest of Tripoli's oil infrastructure, while arguably beneficial to international energy companies, 
would necessitate similar large-scale investments. While oil companies, by their very nature, tend 
to invest in risky and uncertain markets, the possible payouts in the Libyan market may in fact 
make such financial layouts appear tempting on paper. 
 
One last caveat to America investment in the Libyan oil industry is the question of how long U.S.-
Libyan negotiations may last. In the oil business, of course, time is money. Some analyses argue 
that the previous "long, drawn-out bilateral negotiations" could be replaced by speedier licensing 
rounds and the offer of new exploration blocks in a post-U.S. sanctions environment.[31] 
Nonetheless, skepticism remains, and some observers are cautiously wary of how the regime in 
Tripoli and Libya's National Oil Corporation will interact with international — specifically U.S. — oil 
firms following a normalization of relations.[32] 
Benefits of relations with Libya: A return to Wheelus AB? 
An equally important benefit of renewed relations with Libya could come in the form of access to 
military basing rights such as at the former strategic U.S. facility known as Wheelus Air Base.[33] 
Vacated in June 1970 by the United States after the September 1969 Libyan revolution, the 
renamed Uqba ben Nafi Air Base boasts huge operational facilities and a runway reported to be 
10,500 feet in length. It has served as Libya's primary air force installation as well as a major 
training facility.[34]  
 
Access to such facilities would offer U.S. forces considerable power-projection in an area of the 
world identified by the Pentagon as one of rising strategic significance. Although prior to the 
September revolution Wheelus and other North African bases were of decreasing military 
significance, their utility may be of greater importance considering new geopolitical realities.[35] 
The region stretching from Africa's west coast through the Middle East and Persian Gulf and into 
Central Asia has been labeled by the Pentagon as a part of the world in which U.S. forces may 
have to deploy in the future. This "arc of instability" is coming under the increased attention of 
U.S. military policy planners.[36] As part of the Defense Department's desire to relocate and 
reposition forces, places such as Hungary and Romania, as well as Mali and Djibouti, have been 
identified as cost efficient, strategically located, and positively inclined to host American 
forces.[37] 
 
Renewed access to Libyan locales could offer American national security planners an attractive 
facility easily within reach of European-based forces, yet positioned to quickly deploy U.S. forces 
to future regional trouble spots such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Horn of Africa. Libyan-based 
forces could also be employed in support of maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean 
and Red Sea as such operations become increasingly commonplace. 
 
The Wheelus/Uqba ben Nafi AB, for example, has been nearly completely enveloped by the 
surrounding city. This fact would contribute to its relative unattractiveness for U.S. policy 
planners; however plenty of other locations in Libya exist far from prying eyes — and possibly 
restive neighbors. Foreign military basing rights within Libya would also be a reversal of decades 
of recent policy and posture — especially while Colonel Qadhafi remains in power. This said, 
under a future government such arrangements may be negotiable. Perhaps the evolution of a 
new government would permit the discussion of such a sensitive issue.[38] 
Moving beyond its terrorist past 
In recent years, Libya has done much to move beyond its terrorist past. The reputation of a 
maintaining a 'revolutionary state' has cost Tripoli dearly and the regime has sought to moderate 
its behavior. The costs of defying the United States for the Libyan leadership have simply become 
too high to continue.[39]  
 
The most significant developments in Libya's efforts to come to terms with its terrorist past have 
come from Tripoli's desire to finally put to rest once and for all the Lockerbie bombing issue. 
Tripoli has handed over Abd al-Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifah Fhimah for trial for the 
1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Al- Megrahi — described as a Libyan intelligence agent — 
was convicted for his role in the bombing. On 15 August 2003, Libya accepted "responsibility for 
the actions of its officials" in the bombing in a letter to the UN Security Council.[40] The day the 
two suspects were handed over in 1999, UN sanctions were suspended; in September 2003 UN 
sanctions were finally removed from the books.[41] As a further attempt to put the Lockerbie 
issue in the past, the Libyan government has offered four million dollars compensation per victim 
of the bombing, and another six million dollars per victim after the end of U.S. sanctions on Libya.  
 
Likewise, on 9 January Tripoli agreed to pay $170 million in compensation to the victims of the 
1989 mid-air explosion of French airline flight UTA 772 over Niger. A French court found six 
Libyans guilty in absentia for their role in the attack in March, 1999, that killed 170 passengers, 
including the wife of the U.S. ambassador to Chad. 
 
Libya has ended its support for terrorist groups, and expelled the notorious reactionary 
Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal in 1997 after sheltering him and his organization for 10 years.[42] 
In 1999, Libya accepted 'general responsibility' for the murder of British police constable Yvonne 
Fletcher who was killed by a shot fired from within the Libyan People's Bureau in London and 
paid an undisclosed sum to Fletcher's family. The La Belle Discothèque bombing in West Berlin 
which killed two U.S. servicemen and a Turkish woman and wounded 229 has been settled in a 
German court, and recently Tripoli has been seen to moderate its involvement in Africa's 
revolutionary struggles. According to the State Department, there have not been any credible 
reports of Libyan involvement in acts of state-sponsored terrorism since at least 1994.[43]  
Assessment 
Colonel Qadhafi has taken substantial steps to distance Tripoli from it former policies. There is 
little doubt among Libya watchers that this has been a concerted effort to end the U.S. sanctions. 
The recent steps to publicly abandon the quest for weapons of mass destruction are but the most 
recent measure.  
 
Libya's WMD program has widely been believed to have consisted of primarily chemical warfare 
agents. These systems have been termed "very low quality weapons designs with poor fusing 
and lethality."[44] It was suspected that Libyan forces employed mustard gas in 1987 at the close 
of the war with Chad. Furthermore, since Libya is presumed to have ceased manufacturing CW 
agents, the regime's aging stockpiles are believed to have deteriorated during their prolonged 
storage.  
 
Despite recent claims to the contrary, Libya did not have a biological warfare program of note. 
Although Tripoli was considered to be seeking long-range missile technology,[45] its nuclear 
program was in its infancy.[46] As a result, the disarmament announcement has been termed "a 
small and largely symbolic component" of a multi-year "trilateral dialogue with the U.S. and Britain 
over the terms of a political modus vivendi."[47] From a Libyan perspective, this was but yet 
another step to satisfy Washington's demands in exchange for Libya's removal from the list of 
state sponsors of terrorism.  
 
It is important within the discussion of Libya's renunciation of WMD not to downplay its 
significance. This is a regime that has stymied Western interests, and long sought illicit weapons. 
The changes of course perceived in Tripoli's policy — regardless of the motivations — should be 
commended, and recognized for what they are: a triumph of international diplomacy. It goes 
without saying that the world is both safer and less at risk of proliferation as a result of this 
diplomatic breakthrough.  
 
Relations between the United States and Libya now stand at a crossroads. As Western 
intelligence agencies and disarmament organizations verify Tripoli's renunciation of WMD, there 
exists an opportunity for an improvement in relations. Proof of Libya's forthcoming has been 
provided by recent transfers of sensitive nuclear-related material into US custody. At the end of 
January, a "U.S. military transport plane flew 550,000 pounds of nuclear-related equipment and 
material out of Libya to the U.S. The shipment was estimated to be just 5% of the nuclear 
equipment the U.S. plans to move out in coming weeks, but it included the most sensitive 
parts."[48] While this is just a beginning, this gesture can be taken as a significant step indicating 
Tripoli's sincere desire to return to the fold. 
 
Upgrading Libya's status would demonstrate to other nations that it is possible to graduate from 
the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and may have the effect of encouraging other governments 
to cooperate with international arms control regimes. While it's doubtful that Qadhafi's decision 
will have much influence on Syria's Bashar al-Asad, it could demonstrate to Damascus that there 
is room for U.S.-Syrian relations to improve.  
 
Moreover, close cooperation with Libyan authorities can benefit Western counter-terrorism efforts, 
as well as assist in unraveling the murky network of international proliferators. As has been the 
case since Tripoli began its cooperation with Washington, the Libyan regime can provide 
significant help in unraveling the international black market in nuclear material and know-how. 
Such cooperation can help shut down what has come to be known as the Pakistani connection. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations with Tripoli can do much to help end this illicit network, 
and is a small price to pay for closing one of the single greatest proliferation networks in recent 
memory.  
 
In spring 2000 a four-member U.S. consular delegation visited Libya. The travel restriction for 
U.S. citizens continues, justified on the grounds of security, not political reasons.[49] Now, an 
increased U.S. presence in Tripoli is slated to participate in Libya's disarmament. While this is a 
meager beginning, it may also lay the groundwork for a limited American presence in Libya to 
work out the modalities of normalization. The Bush Administration's decision to engage in 
diplomatic discussion with the Libyans in London in February is a positive and welcome step in 
which to create a public forum where Washington can raise its other concerns vis-à-vis the 
regime in Tripoli.[50] Once a productive dialogue is established, full normalization cannot be far 
behind — nor should it. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
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